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Abstract
The year 2020 marks the centennial of the publication of Arthur Cecil Pigou’s mag-
num opus The Economics of Welfare. Pigou’s pricing principles have had an endur-
ing influence on the academic debate, with a widespread consensus having emerged 
among economists that Pigouvian taxes or subsidies are theoretically desirable, but 
politically infeasible. In this article, we revisit Pigou’s contribution and argue that 
this consensus is somewhat spurious, particularly in two ways: (1) Economists are 
too quick to ignore the theoretical problems and subtleties that Pigouvian pricing 
still faces; (2) The wholesale skepticism concerning the political viability of Pig-
ouvian pricing is at odds with its recent practical achievements. These two points 
are made by, first, outlining the theoretical and political challenges that include 
uncertainty about the social cost of carbon, the unclear relationship between the 
cost–benefit and cost-effectiveness approaches, distributional concerns, fragmented 
ministerial responsibilities, an unstable tax base, commitment problems, lack of 
acceptance and trust between government and citizens as well as incomplete inter-
national cooperation. Secondly, we discuss the recent political success of Pigouvian 
pricing, as evidenced by the German government’s 2019 climate policy reform and 
the EU’s Green Deal. We conclude by presenting a research agenda for addressing 
the remaining barriers that need to be overcome to make Pigouvian pricing a com-
mon political practice.
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No “invisible hand” can be relied on to produce a good arrangement of the 
whole from a combination of separate treatments of the parts. It is therefore 
necessary that an authority of wider reach should intervene to tackle the col-
lective problems of beauty, of air and light, as those other collective problems 
of gas and water have been tackled.
(Pigou 1920, Part I, Chapter VI, §11, pp. 170–171)
1 Introduction
2020 marks the centennial of the publication of Arthur Cecil Pigou’s magnum opus 
The Economics of Welfare. In this masterpiece of economic theory, Pigou set out 
“to study certain important groups of causes affecting economic welfare in actual 
modern societies” (Pigou 1920, Part I, Chapter I, §5, p. 11). It is noteworthy that 
Pigou used the term “actual modern societies” when stating the objective of his mis-
sion. Over the course of his early career leading up to the publication of his magnum 
opus, Pigou became a disciple of Alfred Marshall. As such, he supported Marshall’s 
efforts to establish economics as a discipline in its own right (Maloney 1985), set-
ting it apart from philosophy and history. In particular, he distanced himself from 
economic historians, who, since the Methodenstreit in the 1880s, saw themselves 
as being increasingly separated from the new orthodoxy in economics, which now 
studied neo-classical equilibria and marginal utility (Hobsbawm 1987, chap. 11).
Pigou was heavily engaged in contemporary politics and public debates of his 
times. In several columns, penned by the young Pigou, he advocated free-trade prin-
ciples and argued against Chamberlain’s protectionist trade policies. Reacting to a 
senior cabinet member’s campaign, he mounted a defense of pension schemes that 
retain incentives to work. His writings on the efficiency of land rent taxation engen-
dered a heated controversy among liberal members of parliament. Pigou continued 
working on social questions, such as minimum housing standards, unemployment 
benefits and medical insurance (Takami 2014).
In this tribute, however, we wish to focus on Pigou’s contributions that laid the 
groundwork for the modern field of environmental economics (Sandmo 2015). 
In The Economics of Welfare, Pigou defined positive and negative externalities, 
described their impacts on production and devised ways of correcting or internal-
izing these externalities:
In like manner, for every industry in which the value of the marginal social net 
product is less than that of the marginal private net product, there will be cer-
tain rates of tax, the imposition of which by the State would increase the size 
of the national dividend and increase economic welfare; and one rate of tax, 
which would have the optimum effect in this respect.
(Pigou 1932, 4th ed., Part II, Chapter XI, §11)
Local air pollution was already a significant problem at that time, as dust led to 
higher electricity demand (lightening) as well as higher costs for cleaning buildings 
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and clothes—a problem that Pigou highlights in his book by citing a governmental 
report1:
A valuable investigation was made in 1918 by the Manchester Air Pollution 
Advisory Board into the comparative cost of household washing in Manches-
ter—a smoky town—as compared with Harrogate—a clean town. The investi-
gator obtained 100 properly comparable statements for Manchester and Harro-
gate respectively as to the cost of the weekly washing in working-class houses. 
These showed an extra cost in Manchester of 7½d. a week per household for 
fuel and washing material. The total loss for the whole city, taking the extra 
cost of fuel and washing materials alone, disregarding the extra labor involved, 
and assuming no greater loss for middle-class than for working-class house-
holds (a considerable under-statement), works out at over £290,000 a year for a 
population of three quarters of a million.
(Pigou 1932, 4th ed. Part II, Chapter IX, §10, Footnote 68)
Today, we see Pigou’s legacy in the fundamental concepts of externalities and their 
correction through Pigouvian taxes or subsidies, which are taught in elementary 
economics courses. Modern research on optimal environmental taxation has often 
equated a tax set at marginal environmental damages with the Pigouvian tax (Cre-
mer et al. 1998). In this line, various works have analyzed optimal policies in so-
called second-best settings, that is, when there exist market failures or distortions 
besides the environmental externality. Examples are different forms of heterogeneity 
combined with imperfect information, leakage effects due to jurisdictional spillo-
vers, market concentration, innovation market failures, etc. In these settings, the 
fundamental research question is often whether the optimal environmental tax devi-
ates from the ‘Pigouvian level’—and in what direction (Aronsson and Sjögren 2018; 
Cremer et  al. 2003; Jacobs and De Mooij 2015; Jacobs and van der Ploeg 2019; 
Parry 1995; Requate 2005a, 2005b; Van der Ploeg 2016).
These findings confirm, rather than disprove, the Pigouvian idea, as the underly-
ing principle corresponds to Pigou’s approach of setting a tax that maximizes wel-
fare. In that sense, Pigou’s claim that “there will be certain rates of tax [that] would 
increase […] economic welfare; and one rate of tax, which would have the optimum 
effect in this respect” also holds in second-best settings. Hence, the widespread 
convention of equating the ‘Pigouvian tax’ with marginal environmental damages, 
rather than the optimal second-best tax rate, fails to do justice to Pigou’s work. 
In what follows, we, therefore, consider a broader definition of Pigouvian pricing 
policies, namely those that maximize welfare (in either first-best or second-best 
settings).
Notwithstanding the strong economic argument for Pigouvian pricing, environ-
mental policy in many countries has been dominated by regulation, standards, and, 
in some cases, emission trading schemes (Cullenward and Victor 2020; Keohane 
1 Pigou citing this report shows that he did not only expatiate upon environmental problems within a 
theoretical framework, but that he also thought about ways of using empirical data to estimate environ-
mental damages (Sandmo 2015).
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et al. 1997). Despite strong support for stricter environmental policy, we see little 
public support for using environmental taxes (European Commission 2019)—nei-
ther for estimated second-best tax rates, nor for estimated first-best Pigouvian taxes.
There are only few examples of Pigouvian taxes that attempt to reflect marginal 
social benefits—the US oil extraction tax to pay a fund for cleaning up oil pollution 
accidents is a rare example, where the tax rate is determined by a social cost consid-
eration (Masur and Posner 2015). Even if taxes or levies are set to reduce environ-
mental pollution, they are often based on political considerations rather than on rig-
orous assessments of the marginal social cost. Hence, many taxes that are part of the 
environmental policy mix, if they can be called Pigouvian at all, do not reflect the true 
marginal social costs—but the balance of political power of different interest groups. 
Similarly, energy and fuel taxes are often below their Pigouvian optimum (Coady et al. 
2018) when taking into account the externalities associated with global warming or 
local air pollution. Globally, most taxes on fossil energy (irrespective of whether they 
are explicitly targeted at carbon emissions or not) are still far below the social cost of 
carbon (see Fig. 1). In some cases, the effective carbon price is even negative due to 
subsidies on fossil fuels (not shown in Fig. 1 due to data reasons). The International 
Energy Agency estimates that annual global expenditures for subsidies on fossil fuels 
averaged approximately US$ 340 billion in the period from 2016 to 2019.2 Similar to 
fuel taxes, taxes on tobacco and alcohol are often set based on revenue motives (Masur 
and Posner 2015). While some countries, like the US and the UK, require regulatory 
Fig. 1  Effective carbon prices resulting from existing excise taxes, duties and carbon prices on fossil 
energy. Source: own figure based on OECD’s effective carbon rate data in Kalkuhl et al. (2018) and tem-
perature-related social costs of carbon (Kalkuhl and Wenz, 2020). Note that subsidies on fossil fuels are 
not included in this figure
2 See the IEA’s fossil fuel subsidies data base, https ://www.iea.org/topic s/energ y-subsi dies (accessed on 
November 12, 2020).
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impact assessments of social costs and benefits of policy proposals, the latter have 
rarely resulted in taxes that conform to Pigouvian pricing principles. Instead, these 
assessments, more often than not, merely rationalize other environmental policies, such 
as fuel efficiency standards.
Pigou’s work is still of utmost relevance today, especially since the chasm between 
the theory of Pigouvian pricing and its political implementation remains significant, as 
the above examples illustrate. Large market failures remain unaddressed—among them 
the adverse effects of greenhouse gas emissions, the loss of biodiversity and the under-
provision of public goods related to innovation, knowledge and health services (e.g., 
vaccination).
In this article, we will revisit the relevance of the Pigouvian pricing principle for 
contemporary economic research and policy-making by defending two basic claims:
1. While economists are right to believe Pigouvian taxes to be theoretically desir-
able, they are also prone to overlooking the significant theoretical problems that 
Pigouvian taxes still face. Paying scant attention to these conceptual problems is, 
however, likely to impede their implementation in practice.
2. The widely held belief that Pigouvian taxes are ‘politically infeasible’ rests on a 
rather flimsy factual basis—as is borne out by an increasing number of countries 
adopting carbon prices.
These two claims imply that the widespread consensus, namely that Pigouvian taxes 
are theoretically desirable, yet politically infeasible, throws a spanner in the works 
of scientific progress. Specifically, holding on to this consensus impedes necessary 
research into conceptual problems, whilst inducing economists to abandon welfare-
maximizing policies too readily, instead accepting politically less demanding options. 
Both tendencies cause additional deadweight losses to societies.
We will focus on the case of climate change due to the ongoing political ambitions 
to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in many countries and the lessons learned 
from successful and failed attempts to price carbon. We will use the term Pigouvian 
taxation to refer to direct pricing policies, such as taxes and levies—as opposed to indi-
rect pricing via emissions certificate trading. A price collar is subsumed under direct 
pricing.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: We outline key conceptual 
challenges for implementing Pigouvian taxes (Sect. 2), we then discuss how current 
climate policy has increasingly moved toward Pigouvian principles and carbon pricing 
(Sect. 3), and finally suggest a research agenda (Sect. 4) for addressing remaining barri-
ers to make Pigouvian pricing a common political practice. We conclude (Sect. 5) with 
some reflections on the legacy of Pigou’s work for contemporary economic policy.
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2  Barriers to implementing Pigouvian taxes and subsidies
There is a broad consensus on the theoretical optimality of Pigouvian taxes among a 
diverse set of economic, political and philosophical thinkers.3 However, implement-
ing Pigouvian taxes and subsidies is fraught with several theoretical and political 
challenges that have often impeded their use in favor of other regulatory measures. 
In the following, we will briefly sketch these challenges.
2.1  Uncertainties about marginal benefits, e.g., the social cost of carbon
A Pigouvian tax on carbon emissions has to be set equal to the social cost of carbon 
(SCC), which refers to the discounted marginal damages from a marginal increase in 
carbon emissions along a pre-defined emission path. Uncertainties about the social 
cost of carbon are considerable, with values from well-established integrated assess-
ment models (IAMs) ranging from 7 US$/tCO2 in FUND (Waldhoff et  al. 2011), 
to 31 US$/tCO2 in DICE (Nordhaus 2017) and much higher values exceeding 100 
US$/tCO2 obtained from recent econometric analyses (e.g., Kalkuhl and Wenz 
2020; Ricke et al. 2018) or expert surveys (Pindyck 2019). In addition to uncertain-
ties with respect to the climate system, technologies or climate damages (Gilling-
ham et al. 2018), the SCC strongly depends on normative choices regarding discount 
rates (Nordhaus 2017) and equity weights (Adler et al. 2017; Anthoff and Emmer-
ling 2018).
2.2  Unclear relation between cost–benefit analysis and cost‑effectiveness 
analysis
Because of the large uncertainty range, the difficulties associated with quantifying 
catastrophic risk and non-market damages as well as the elusive search for agree-
ment on fundamental normative parameters, the intergovernmental panel on climate 
change (IPCC) has not used the concept of the SCC for policy advice. It has, instead, 
focused on qualitative and quantitative impacts of warming for different temperature 
levels. Quantity targets on emissions, temperature targets or the time when ‘carbon 
neutrality’ is achieved are easier to communicate to the public—as these targets 
convey a very concrete environmental outcome. The environmental implication of 
a carbon price is, however, uncertain and unclear for many people. Politically, the 
uncertainty associated with the SCC and the relation between cost-effectiveness 
analysis (CEA) and cost–benefit analysis (CBA) has called the political viability 
of Pigouvian taxation into question, as the political focus is on reducing emissions 
rather than internalizing external costs. Accordingly, environmental targets play a 
more important role internationally and at the EU level.
3 Among these are Milton Friedman, Joseph Stiglitz, Greg Mankiw, Bill Nordhaus, Lord Nicholas Stern 
and Pope Francis.
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From an economic perspective, any emission target can—in principle—be 
achieved by an emissions tax. The emissions tax is a cost efficient instrument for 
achieving the target, even if it is not optimal from a social welfare perspective (Bau-
mol and Oates 1971). In this respect, a welfare-maximizing approach and a cost-
efficiency approach may imply the same choice of the policy instruments, although 
tax levels—and the procedure of their adjustments—may differ.
Besides these seemingly subtle differences between a target-based (CEA) and a 
welfare-based (CBA) approach, it remains unclear for many economists how to rec-
oncile the two concepts. Typically, studies a priori decide to follow either the one 
or the other approach. However, both approaches can inform and strengthen each 
other. A politically set climate target that deviates strongly from a welfare-maxi-
mizing climate target constitutes an inconsistency that should be resolved. The dis-
crepancy reflects to some extent the limited possibilities to incorporate deep uncer-
tainty, systemic risks or non-market damages into traditional cost–benefit modeling. 
As economists have started to incorporate these aspects into their models, optimal 
temperature targets have often decreased and the SCC increased, implying a nar-
rowing gap between political targets and welfare-optimal targets (Dietz and Ven-
mans 2019; Hänsel et al. 2020; Lemoine and Traeger 2014, 2016a, 2016b). Thus, 
the long-standing discrepancy has inspired economic works to account for vari-
ous aspects of global warming that had previously been neglected. But politically 
set targets should also be adjusted to new insights from cost–benefit analyses. For 
example, cost–benefit analyses could help us identify the conditions and normative 
assumptions required for more stringent climate targets like the 1.5 °C target to be 
welfare-optimal.
The difference between target-based and welfare-optimization-based approaches 
diminishes if targets are understood as the outcome of a decision process that 
involves broader social cost–benefit considerations under uncertainty. Politically, 
this implies that climate targets are considered provisional goals, which provide ori-
entation for the future development of our societies. Crucially, however, significant 
political capacity is required to adjust and update these targets with new scientific 
insights.
2.3  Distributional concerns
Distributional concerns are at the heart of policy-making. Pigouvian pricing there-
fore faces the challenge of ensuring an equitable distribution of the burdens it cre-
ates among heterogeneous households as well as among heterogeneous firms.
Households choose consumption baskets with strongly varying carbon intensities. 
In industrialized countries, there is typically a negative correlation between income 
and carbon intensity, giving rise to a regressive effect of Pigouvian carbon pricing—
an issue of vertical distribution. However, there is reason to believe that the hetero-
geneity in carbon intensity within one income group—an issue of horizontal equity 
(Pizer and Sexton 2019)—is politically and economically at least as important as 
the questions dealing with vertical equity. In public debates and the media, hardship 
cases of households with high carbon footprints (e.g., commuters living in badly 
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insulated homes) are frequently used to criticize carbon pricing on account of the 
unfair distributional outcomes it engenders.
However, regressive distributional effects might turn out to be less severe when 
further general-equilibrium effects are taken into account explicitly. As long as the 
economy as a whole is relatively carbon-intensive, carbon taxes put a higher burden 
on capital income compared to wages because capital-intensive industries are more 
carbon-intensive (Goulder et al. 2019; Rausch et al. 2011).
Firms and investors, on the other hand, face the problem of stranded assets. The 
threat is particularly relevant for owners of fossil resources who stand to lose large 
rents (Bauer et al. 2016; Kalkuhl and Brecha 2013; van der Ploeg and Rezai 2020)—
but also for ‘brown capital’ which cannot be converted into ‘green capital’ (Kalkuhl 
et al. 2020; Rozenberg et al. 2020). Moreover, the stability of the financial system 
could be compromised (Carney 2016).
As a Pigouvian tax constitutes a potential Pareto-improvement, there should 
theoretically be a way of redistributing the tax revenues that makes everyone bet-
ter off. Such a redistribution scheme is, however, difficult to implement given the 
informational requirements, the transaction costs, potential incentive problems and 
the diffuse as well as uncertain nature of various environmental damages. Because 
of the direct and immediately felt costs of Pigouvian taxation, which contrast with 
the more abstract and aggregate benefits, policy-makers and the public have to take 
a leap of faith when putting their trust in the efficiency-enhancing impact.
The consideration of distributional effects is a prime example of Pigouvian taxes 
under second-best conditions. The early works on the double dividend hypothesis, 
for example, studied how environmental taxes interact with a distortionary tax sys-
tem (Bovenberg and Goulder 1996; Parry and Bento 2000; Phaneuf and Requate 
2017). This strand of research assumed that lump-sum taxes are impossible and pub-
lic revenues have to be raised through distortionary labor taxes. A key question this 
literature has sought to address was whether the optimal environmental tax should 
be higher or lower than the marginal damages. Later works, however, have relaxed 
the assumption of infeasible lump-sum transfers and added an explicit distributional 
motive to the social welfare function, for example Cremer et al. (1998, 2003) and 
Jacobs and van der Ploeg (2019). This setting generates an endogenous (optimal-
ity) argument to rely on distortionary income taxes for financing the government 
budget. Under specific conditions, equity and efficiency can be separated (Aronsson 
and Sjögren 2018, provide an excellent overview). While the optimal environmental 
tax typically includes a component reflecting the marginal environmental damages, 
it may also contain further terms accounting for heterogeneity of households and 
overall costs of public funds.
2.4  Fragmented responsibilities
The executive branch of a typical modern (democratic) government is divided 
into separate ministries. Since contemporary economies strongly depend on fos-
sil fuels as an input, multiple ministries, apart from the ministry for the environ-
ment, are responsible for mitigating the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs). The 
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target-based approach mentioned above implies that national emission targets are 
split into sectoral targets with specific ministries responsible for achieving ‘their’ 
goals. There are ministries responsible for specific GHG emitting sectors of a 
national economy (transportation and infrastructure, agriculture, housing and build-
ing, industry and power) and ministries for cross-cutting areas (finance ministry, 
ministry of economics, foreign ministry). Due to the lack of a ministry for climate 
change mitigation, responsibilities are fragmented. The resulting lack of coordina-
tion has led to an excessive focus on sector-specific policies and technology policies. 
Consequently, most carbon pricing initiatives that exist today cover only a subset 
of all economic sectors. The European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), for 
example, covers only the power sector, industry and aviation. Agriculture, transport 
and the building sectors have been left out. Within these sectors, different ministries 
are responsible for reducing emissions. However, these ministries are targeted by the 
respective lobby groups. From a political economy perspective, ministries are likely 
to provide additional subsidies when emission targets are not fulfilled. As set out in 
a recent German government report, most of these subsidy schemes are ineffective 
in this context (Deutsche Bundesregierung 2020).
The sectoral approach implies substantial costs that arise in virtue of the reduced 
flexibility to avoid emissions where it is cheapest. Additionally, ignoring secto-
ral trade-offs, synergies and spillovers, leads to misallocation of mitigation efforts 
and investments. Harmonizing carbon prices across the EU-ETS, the transport and 
building sectors—that are not covered by the EU-ETS—could yield welfare gains 
of more than 1%, in particular in later periods when carbon price differentials will 
increase substantially (Hübler and Löschel 2013). There is further compelling theo-
retical and empirical evidence that misallocation across sectors increases not only 
static mitigation costs but also reduces total factor productivity (Banerjee and 
Moll 2010; Moll 2014). Implementing a carbon price therefore requires overcom-
ing the ‘divide-and-conquer’ principle of many modern bureaucracies. However, it 
also implies a delegation of power as specific, previously used sectoral instruments 
become obsolete under uniform and harmonized carbon pricing. Until harmonized 
carbon pricing is achieved, sectoral policies will remain important, especially when 
aimed at compensating carbon-intensive industries or households, addressing com-
plementary market failures and providing public goods, e.g., related to infrastruc-
ture, innovation and public investments.
2.5  Unstable tax base
One fundamental objective of every government consists in ensuring that there are 
sufficient public funds to finance public goods. Pigouvian taxation, with the objec-
tive of internalizing the climate externality, would generate substantial public reve-
nues with estimates ranging from 1 to 6% of national GDP (Jakob et al. 2016; Franks 
et al. 2018; Kalkuhl et al. 2018; IMF 2019a) and would thus be a part of the national 
fiscal system. For those governments that have pledged to achieve carbon neutrality 
by the middle of the twenty-first century the additional tax revenues associated with 
environmental Pigouvian taxes are only temporary. Moreover, it is hard to predict 
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how fast a given carbon tax path will lead to the desired GHG emission reductions; 
it is even harder to predict the price evolution of emission certificates when, instead 
of a tax, an ETS is implemented. The upshot is that greenhouse gases are an unsta-
ble tax base, which makes the construction of a general system of public finances 
that is consistent with reducing emissions a non-trivial task for finance ministers.
Environmental ministers, on the other hand, are responsible for achieving the 
environmental goals of emissions reduction. There is a tendency for them to choose 
climate policy instruments under the constraint that costly coordination with the 
ministry of finance should be avoided. Quantity instruments, standards and trading 
schemes are thus preferred over carbon taxes. The problem of the unstable tax base 
can thus also be understood as a problem of fragmented responsibilities.
2.6  Commitment problems
Climate policy requires a substantial shift in investments from brown to green tech-
nologies (IEA 2018; McCollum et al. 2018). Investments worth approximately 1% of 
current global GDP would have to be re-directed if we are to limit the rise in global 
mean temperature to 2 °C. Carbon prices can only trigger such enormous shifts in 
investments if they are highly credible, that is, if investors expect carbon prices to 
increase over time on a trajectory that is consistent with the 2  °C target. Govern-
ments have thus far lacked the ability to credibly commit themselves to such carbon 
price trajectories since they are subject to the vagaries and (dynamic) inconsisten-
cies that result from electoral competition. Nor have they delegated the decision to 
set carbon price paths to an independent body. This creates political uncertainty, 
which undermines the dynamic efficiency of carbon pricing and slows investment 
shifts and innovation.
Besides political uncertainties, time inconsistency problems further aggravate 
the formation of stable expectations about announced future Pigouvian price paths. 
Governments are driven by various motives. These include fiscal motives, seek-
ing specific rents from powerful economic groups and re-election motives. Each 
of these three reasons alone provides an incentive to deviate from announced car-
bon price paths, rendering government decisions time-inconsistent (Harstad 2019; 
Kalkuhl et  al. 2020). Moreover, Pigouvian taxation for national purposes may be 
misused to either mimic tariffs or extract foreign rents (Amundsen and Schöb 1999; 
Franks et al. 2017).
The problem of commitment is less pronounced for standards or investment sub-
sidies—which directly affect investment decisions—but imply higher costs in reduc-
ing emissions. Likewise, sectoral mitigation targets might help to foster expectations 
and commitment because they can increase the institutional incentives of ministries 
to achieve these targets. The preceding shows why policy-makers tend to have little 
trust that carbon prices induce dynamically efficient investment and innovation deci-
sions. This is supported by the skeptical reasoning of environmentalists or non-eco-
nomic scientists that carbon pricing is good at harvesting the currently low-hanging 
fruits to mitigate emissions, but may not enable plantation of fruit trees for future 
harvest (Rosenbloom et al. 2020). Without dynamically efficient and credible carbon 
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prices, markets might actually favor abatement options that are dynamically inef-
ficient (Vogt-Schilb et al. 2018).
2.7  Lack of acceptance/commodification objection
Carbon pricing and carbon markets are perceived as repugnant by some environ-
mental groups. Page (2011), for example, holds that the permit trading mechanism 
established in the Kyoto Protocol erodes norms of responsibility in the future, com-
modifies the atmosphere in an illegitimate manner and erodes the environmen-
tal morale. In the same vein, Sandel (2012), raises fundamental moral objections 
to market mechanisms. Moreover, in an experimental setting, Jakob et  al. (2017) 
have shown that market-based policies, while efficient, conflict with moral behav-
ior. According to the authors, moral responsibility induced study participants to take 
inefficient actions that reduced the earnings of the whole group of participants.
2.8  Trust between governments and citizens
Klenert et  al. (2018) argue that Pigouvian taxation is more acceptable to voters 
when the general level of trust between citizens and government is rather high. The 
recent protests of the yellow vest movement in France are a case in point, illustrating 
that high levels of distrust can lead to public opposition to Pigouvian taxation. Pre-
liminary results of a recent survey-based study in France (Douenne and Fabre, 2020, 
SURED Conference) show that respondents who oppose the tax tend to discard pos-
itive information about it, which would be consistent with distrust, uncertainty, or 
motivated reasoning.
2.9  Incomplete international cooperation
Finally, Pigouvian taxation could work well for national environmental problems 
where a national government exists. For transboundary problems, a regional or 
global government would be needed to implement Pigouvian taxes. In the absence 
of the latter, national governments are subject to free-rider problems. Even govern-
ments that are committed to reducing emissions are constrained by carbon leakage 
problems, when implementing high carbon prices. Empirically, carbon leakage has 
played only a very minor role so far (see, e.g., Naegele and Zaklan 2019). However, 
with rising carbon prices, leakage might become a more severe problem (Babiker 
2005).
3  Pigouvian pricing in the wild: a drama in three acts
Despite all the challenges associated with putting Pigouvian taxes into practice, car-
bon pricing, across the world, has increased considerably since the early 1990s when 
Finland and Sweden were the first countries to implement a carbon tax. According 
to the World Bank’s carbon pricing dashboard, as of the year 2020, 16% of global 
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GHG emissions are subject to an explicit carbon price—typically, though, at rela-
tively low levels.4 6% of emissions are regulated under carbon taxes compared to 
10% under emissions trading schemes, where emission targets are set and prices 
evolve endogenously.
In the following, we will focus on carbon pricing in actual modern societies. We 
will trace Pigou’s legacy to Germany’s recently enacted carbon price reform (Act 1), 
to the European Union’s Green Deal proposal (Act 2) and finally to reform proposals 
aimed at increasing cooperation at the international level (Act 3). As was and still 
is to be expected, the practical application of Pigouvian policies provides a rich set 
of lessons. Hence, at the end of this section, we will discuss how much progress has 
been made in overcoming the barriers that we have outlined in Sect. 2 and summa-
rize the lessons learned and their implications for the future of carbon pricing. The 
implementation of carbon prices is—despite widespread skepticism—a real option 
for policy-makers.
3.1  Act 1: Germany’s carbon price reform
Germany provides a prime example for a recent carbon price reform, introducing a 
paradigm shift in climate policy. The German case illustrates how quickly a pricing 
system can be implemented that was previously assessed ‘politically infeasible’ by 
many experts and economists. Policy-makers across the political spectrum as well 
as the general public were extremely wary, or outright distrustful, of using price sig-
nals to promote environmental goals. For decades, the German government applied 
regulation, command-and-control policies, subsidies and standards to reduce (fossil) 
energy consumption. In the early 2000s, the coalition government, consisting of the 
Social Democrats and the Greens, implemented an environmental tax reform that 
increased energy taxes, whilst shying away from implementing economy-wide, har-
monized carbon prices, which would increase over time. Finally, in 2019, the Ger-
man government initiated a consultation process between various ministries, experts 
and scientists to design a new climate policy package that would include, among 
several other measures, a national carbon price for the heating and transport sectors.
The drive to pass any meaningful climate legislation was partly due to pressure 
by the young generation. In particular, the Fridays for Future movement emerged 
from the center of society and also managed to make parts of the (conservative) 
establishment take their concerns seriously. Yet, substantial pressure also came from 
the EU Effort Sharing Regulation that mandates emission reductions in the non-EU-
ETS sectors, in particular in the heating, transport and agriculture sectors.
Non-compliance with the EU Effort Sharing Regulation, which was adopted 
in 2018, entails substantial costs to the respective government. A non-compliant 
member state can only avoid penalty payments to the EU Commission if another 
member state manages to exceed its specific targets (by emitting less than origi-
nally intended) and sells its remaining quota to the non-compliant member state. 
4 Additionally taking into account other taxes and levies not explicitly targeted at GHGs results in a 
higher percentage of emissions covered by effective carbon prices (see Fig. 1).
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The price of such remaining quotas is highly uncertain; it is not certain whether 
there will be any supply at all. In any case, the German government also feared a 
strong reputation loss should it violate EU norms and not meet its self-imposed 
emission target.
Early on, the government aimed at introducing a carbon price of some form to 
cover the heating and the transport sectors, while GHG emission reductions in the 
agriculture sector would be achieved by other means. The German debate centered 
around two design questions: whether to implement a price or a quantity instru-
ment to establish a carbon price and how to use the revenues. The price vs. quantity 
debate divided the respective political camps, with market liberals and conservatives 
opting for a ‘marked-based’ ETS and Social Democrats favoring the ‘tax’.
The assessment by MCC and PIK, that is the Mercator Research Institute on 
Global Commons and Climate Change and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact 
Research (Edenhofer et  al. 2019), in combination with a report by the Economic 
Advisory Council (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftli-
chen Entwicklung 2019), emphasized that both approaches can be designed in such 
a way that very similar outcomes are achieved. In particular, the carbon tax would 
require frequent adjustments if emission targets by 2030 are to be met with certainty. 
The MCC-PIK assessment, however, also discussed a hybrid model starting with a 
fixed-price ETS (which can be implemented rather quickly) that is then transformed 
into an ETS with a price collar, once the necessary regulatory steps—particularly 
the creation of infrastructure and auctioning processes—have been completed. 
Starting with a fixed-price ETS, rather than a temporary carbon tax, avoids poten-
tial legal problems. German constitutional law, in fact, might not have allowed the 
introduction of a direct tax on carbon emissions; rather, existing excise tax rates on 
various fossil energy types could be modified and harmonized according to their 
carbon content (Büdenbender 2019). The ETS with a price collar has two further 
advantages. It guarantees planning reliability for investments (minimum price) and 
simultaneously increases commitment and credibility of the ETS because costs can-
not increase above the maximum price.
Fig. 2  Carbon price for non-ETS sectors in Germany (own illustration, based on Edenhofer et al. 2020)
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The government decided to implement the fixed ETS price starting at 10 €/tCO2 
in 2021 that will then morph into an ETS with minimum and maximum prices. The 
specific levels of the carbon prices were the outcome of a political bargaining pro-
cess among coalition parties. In the ensuing legislative process, the Greens, as an 
opposition party, used their leverage in the second chamber of parliament (Bun-
desrat) to increase carbon prices further. Ultimately, it was decided that the price 
will start at 25 €/tCO2 in 2021, increase to 55 €/tCO2 in 2025 and, after that, the 
price will be formed by the forces of supply and demand on the market for certifi-
cates, where the latter is supplemented with a price collar (Fig. 2). Still, prices are 
below the levels that are likely needed to achieve the reduction in emissions that the 
German government has committed itself to.
The revenues of the German national carbon price are expected to make up a 
significant share of total financing of the whole climate policy package. Together 
with the revenues generated by the EU ETS, carbon pricing is estimated to generate 
about 80% of the €62 billion that the government has allocated to public spending 
over the years 2020 to 2023 for the achievement of the emission reduction targets. 
The remaining 20% are financed from the general government budget. Most of the 
climate-related spending is allocated to programs to reduce emissions or energy use, 
e.g., in the building, industry or transport sectors. In spite of the strong emphasis on 
distributional concerns in public debates, only about 25% of total spending, that is 
about €15 billion over the next four years, will be used to address adverse distribu-
tional impacts (Knopf 2020).
Indeed, distributional concerns were at the center of the discourse leading up to 
the adoption of the carbon pricing reform. Several proposals were made for accom-
panying measures to compensate the losers of the reform, such as commuters and 
owners of badly insulated houses. The term “unsanierter Fernpendler” (long-dis-
tance commuters that live in badly insulated houses) was coined to describe the 
societal group that would be hit hardest by the reform. The debates around the 
reform and its distributional consequences revealed the importance of horizontal 
equity concerns (see also Fischer and Pizer 2019). The option of giving back rev-
enues directly to citizens via a new transfer scheme was dismissed due to adminis-
trative hurdles and because some politicians questioned the effectiveness of carbon 
prices when revenues are completely recycled back to citizens.5 Instead, the govern-
ment put together a bundle of alternative compensation measures. Of the €15 billion 
in that bundle, 80% (€12 billion) are used to reduce electricity prices by lowering 
the national renewable energy levy (EEG-Umlage), 7% (€1.1 billion) to increase 
direct and indirect transfers to long-distance commuters and 1% (€0.2 billion) to 
increase the housing allowance (Knopf 2020). Without any revenue recycling, the 
carbon price would have inflicted an income loss of approximately 0.8% on low- 
and middle-income households—while wealthier households would have faced only 
5 Ongoing research by van der Ploeg, Rezai and Tovar (IIPF conference, 2020) also suggests a theo-
retical efficiency argument against lump-sum rebates of carbon pricing revenues. Such a scheme would 
not take the labor supply reaction into account. The increase in consumer prices would effectively harm 
poorer households more if lump sum transfers are used compared to a reform of non-linear income taxes.
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a 0.5% income loss (see Fig. 3). The estimates provide a first-order approximation 
of the distributional incidence of energy price increases, ignoring any supply- or 
demand-side responses. If all revenues from the national carbon price were redis-
tributed on an equal-per-capita base (‘climate dividend’), low-income households 
would benefit considerably with middle-income households being hardly affected. 
Overall, with the compensation due to reduced energy prices and increased social 
transfers, the lowest income group is hardly affected at all, while the middle class 
bears the largest—yet still moderate—burden of the carbon price incidence. Inter-
estingly, the increase in the 2025 carbon price from 35 €/tCO2 (cabinet decision) 
to 55 €/tCO2 (mediation committee between both legislative chambers) reduced the 
expected costs to the poorest income group as this change also included a stronger 
reduction in the energy price levy.
The levels of the German carbon price are likely too low to achieve the emission 
targets mandated by the EU (see Fig. 2). Yet, the reform has introduced carbon pric-
ing, along with the requisite institutional infrastructure. Correcting prices, especially 
increasing them, is easier now than it was previously. After all, it is remarkable that 
despite several obstacles, a Pigouvian policy has made its way through parliament 
and into political practice. Distributional concerns have been taken into account and 
accompanying measures implemented. Fragmented responsibilities among min-
istries have been overcome by means of an unofficial climate cabinet, with repre-
sentatives of the ministries for the environment, finance, economy, agriculture and 
transport and infrastructure meeting regularly. Environmental groups, most notably 
the Fridays for Future movement, strongly advocated for carbon pricing — far from 
condemning the Pigouvian policy to be morally repugnant.
While there are reasons for calling the German case a success story of mitigation 
policies, the policy package remains imperfect. In addition to the sub optimally low 
Fig. 3  Distributional incidence of the carbon price in 2025. Own illustration, based on Edenhofer et al. 
(2020). Costs indicate real income losses due to increasing energy prices
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carbon price in the German heating and transport sectors, the general problem of 
sector-specific policies remains unresolved. Effective carbon prices, including, e.g., 
pre-existing energy taxes, range from around 30 €/tCO2 in the electricity and non-
electricity sectors, to more than 300 €/tCO2 in the transport sector (OECD 2018). 
The question as to how to cushion the social effects of energy price increases when 
carbon prices rise further and redistribution through existing channels becomes 
increasingly difficult is one of the future challenges that stand in need of resolution.
3.2  Act 2: Towards a comprehensive EU carbon price
The sectoral fragmentation that plagues the German effort to decarbonize the econ-
omy is indicative of the even greater problem of sectoral fragmentation at the EU 
level. This is, however, not the only challenge European climate policy faces. The 
operation of the EU ETS is being disrupted by price volatility, policy-makers’ ina-
bility to commit and waterbed effects6 of national policies that interact with the trad-
ing scheme. Yet, the adoption of the European Green Deal might be an opportunity 
for EU climate policy to turn the tables. As we edge ever closer to a more com-
prehensive EU ETS, we may well be witnessing a Pigouvian moment right at the 
centennial of Pigou’s The Economics of Welfare. In what follows, we will critically 
review the shortcomings of the EU ETS and, more generally, European climate pol-
icy. Finally, we will offer some suggestions on how to redress these shortcomings.
The most obvious inefficiency in the EU’s climate policy program is its high 
degree of sectoral fragmentation. By design, the EU ETS covers only emitting enti-
ties above a certain threshold. Small installations, vehicles as well as buildings fall 
through the cracks. Thus, the trading scheme effectively covers only the industry and 
power sectors. The main instrument in the transport sector is a set of vehicle stand-
ards aimed at reducing emissions. Further, in the agriculture sector, the EU wide 
common agricultural policy (CAP) could provide incentives to reduce emissions 
through green subsidy schemes and programs. Unfortunately, the CAP is dominated 
by an income transfer motive rather than by environmental objectives. Emission tar-
gets in non-ETS sectors have to be met by member states through domestic policies. 
As elaborated in the preceding section, the German carbon price was a response to 
the EU Effort Sharing Regulation.
Aside from sectoral policies, the EU energy directive requires minimum 
energy taxes for various energy types that differ substantially when measured in 
6 A waterbed effect can occur when there is an emissions trading scheme in a union of several sovereign 
jurisdictions and emission certificates can be traded freely across the jurisdictions’ borders, as, e.g., in 
the EU. If one of the members of the union unilaterally introduces an additional policy that effectively 
reduces this member’s emissions, demand for emission certificates falls in this jurisdiction. Other juris-
dictions can now buy the newly available certificates. With the top-level policy in place, reducing emis-
sions in one jurisdiction merely leads to a relocation of emissions but not a reduction beyond the cap 
mandated by the top-level policy. The relocation of emissions without total reduction is akin to pressing 
down on one side of a waterbed leading to water just flowing to the other side without reducing the total 
amount of water in the bed.
1106 O. Edenhofer et al.
1 3
carbon-content (Edenhofer et al. 2020), ranging from less than 5€/tCO2 for coal up 
to almost 180 €/tCO2 for gasoline.
There is growing pressure to reform the system of overlapping policies, which 
creates increasingly diverging incentives to decarbonize sectors, also implying a 
divergence in implicit or explicit carbon prices.7 The pressure will increase further 
as more ambitious mitigation targets are considered, which will tighten the EU 2030 
reduction goal from 40% (compared to 1990 levels) to at least 55%. The EU’s Green 
Deal comprises an expansion of the EU ETS to include further sectors. Hence, the 
German national ETS could ultimately be integrated in the EU ETS, implying a har-
monization of carbon prices across sectors and countries.
Further reform pressure in the EU ETS arises due to the waterbed effects with 
national policies, volatility of carbon prices and the inability to make credible com-
mitments. The latter two problems are intertwined. Volatile allowance prices might 
reduce investment incentives and create additional economic costs (Nordhaus 2007), 
thus undermining the credibility of the cap-and-trade system (Flachsland et  al. 
2020). On the flip side, a large source of price volatility is associated with expec-
tations and speculation about political decisions rather than changes in economic 
fundamentals (Koch et al. 2016). Also, the EU ETS reduction factor of 2.2% is only 
fixed until the end of Phase 4, that is, until 2030. This leaves the future development 
of the cap uncertain, which further impedes investments.
The introduction of the market stability reserve has helped to increase allowance 
prices recently—but the stability reserve also increased complexity in carbon price 
formation (Pahle et al. 2020). It therefore remains questionable whether the reserve 
can reduce price volatility (Perino and Willner 2016). A key alternative is to adopt 
a price collar like other ETS (as, for example in California or in Germany), thereby 
explicitly stabilizing price expectations and, concomitantly, reducing price volatility. 
Another advantage of a price collar is that unilateral policies might not be com-
pletely eliminated by the waterbed effect—in particular, when the minimum price 
becomes binding.
The European Green Deal will likely change the incentive structure of the Euro-
pean Commission and the EU member states. One particularly important element of 
the Green Deal is the proposal to allocate 20% of EU ETS auction revenues to the 
EU budget. As long as auction revenues were under the control of the EU member 
states, sectoral expansion of the EU ETS and the introduction of a minimum price 
would have been in their interest because it would have increased their auction rev-
enues. However, when large parts of these revenues are channeled to the EU level, 
member states might be less interested in an efficiency-improving reform of the EU 
ETS. Additionally, the newly tightened EU emission target provides an incentive 
either to include the transport, heating and building sectors into the EU ETS or, at 
least, to create a second emissions trading scheme for these sectors.
7 The transport sector is subject to both high taxes on fossil energy and efficiency standards, which are 
tightened increasingly. In the building sector, there is only a set of EU minimum taxes, which are quite 
low, i.e., mostly below 10 €/tCO2 (Edenhofer et al., 2020).  CO2 and other GHG emissions, caused by the 
agriculture sector, are not taxed at all.
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However, the EU needs additional funding to repay debt caused by the recent 
COVID-19 crisis. EU member states might accept the proposal to allocate one fifth 
of the auction revenues to the EU if other contributions of the EU member states 
(e.g. GNI contributions) are reduced. It is worth noting that the declining tax base 
makes carbon pricing attractive, even for member states that are skeptical of fund-
ing the EU budget with new resources: These revenues provide sufficient funding to 
repay the EU’s coronavirus borrowing and effectively imply a sunset clause as the 
tax base will eventually diminish. Additionally, climate policy can be perceived as 
a genuine European public good financed by the revenues from the EU emissions 
trading system (Fuest and Pisani-Ferry 2020). To conclude, the EU Green Deal has 
the potential to create a Pigouvian moment within the EU.
3.3  Act 3: The role of carbon pricing in enhancing international cooperation
Climate policy in Germany, in the EU and in several other countries is advancing. In 
a recent video address to the United Nations General Assembly, president Xi Jinping 
announced China’s pledge to become carbon neutral by 2060. However, we are still 
far from bending the curve of global GHG emissions. Most notably, the continued 
use of coal in many developing economies is a large burden on the remaining global 
carbon budget implied by the Paris Agreement. To tackle the problem of the inter-
national renaissance of coal, international negotiations are necessary. In particular, 
they should focus on increasing domestic carbon minimum prices in combination 
with conditional transfers that help to overcome free riding and bring down the high 
cost of capital for renewable energy. Such a paradigm shift is a conditio sine qua 
non for the achievement of the Paris target.
A recent calculation by Edenhofer et al. (2018) suggests that achieving the 1.5 °C 
target is highly compromised by the already committed emissions of existing, under 
construction and planned coal-fired power plants across the world. It is worth noting 
that coal is highly attractive for developing and emerging economies as investing in 
renewable energy, instead of coal, entails much higher up-front capital costs. There-
fore, the relatively high interest rates in these countries reduce the incentives for 
domestic green investments significantly (Best 2017; Hirth and Steckel 2016). The 
implication for carbon pricing in developing countries is then that the high capital 
costs lead to relatively ineffective carbon pricing, as measured by its ability to decar-
bonize the energy sector. Loans at preferential interest rates for low-carbon invest-
ments could therefore increase the penetrative power of carbon pricing substantially.
But, aside from financing low-carbon investments in countries with high capital 
costs, climate policy has been paralyzed by international free-rider problems and the 
absence of mechanisms to sanction free-riding and incentivize cooperation. While 
the Paris Agreement was celebrated as a success of the international community, 
critics argue that the agreement constitutes a Nash equilibrium with respect to the 
national emission reduction pledges. While the global temperature target is ambi-
tious, the agreement lacks any strong enforcement mechanisms.
To overcome free-rider problems, a paradigm shift is necessary that moves away 
from quantity targets to carbon prices as a focal point of international negotiations 
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(Cramton et  al. 2015; P. Cramton et  al. 2017a, b). Quantity targets are plagued 
by various problems, including the difficulty to measure the ‘effort’ of a country, 
which depends on a counterfactual baseline and (hardly verifiable) mitigation costs. 
Focusing on carbon pricing, instead, provides a clear long-term perspective for cli-
mate policy (a globally uniform carbon price that induces efficient mitigation and 
avoids carbon leakage), where temporary price differentials can be tolerated. The 
paradigm shift from quantities to prices also implies an overhaul of international 
climate finance—which has aimed at reducing emissions (quantities) on a project 
base. Within this approach, large financial flows have been generated to offset emis-
sions, e.g., by afforestation projects in developing countries. Yet, the “additional-
ity” of these projects—to what extent they have reduced emissions compared to the 
counterfactual emissions—has been highly disputed. Rather than financing mitiga-
tion projects, an international climate fund should support governments by helping 
them introduce or increase domestic carbon prices (Kornek and Edenhofer 2020). 
This mechanism promises to be more effective in reducing emissions abroad than 
project-based climate finance—and it helps to increase carbon prices and reduce 
price differentials over time.
3.4  Progress made, lessons learned
We trust that the reader of the above three-act drama has developed an appreciation 
of the enormous success of economic policies based on Pigou’s fundamental anal-
ysis. In a rather unlikely reversal of political fortune, carbon prices have emerged 
in several countries around the globe. Their implementation might be fraught with 
inefficiencies, their scope might be too narrow and their level too low. But the out-
side observer of the whole process, at all different levels, has had a highly instruc-
tive opportunity to learn about the stepping stones for overcoming the barriers men-
tioned in Sect. 2. In the following, we examine each barrier and show how they have 
been dealt with in Germany and by the EU. In presenting the lessons learned, we 
hope to distill guidelines for the future of carbon pricing and its role in avoiding 
dangerous climate change (see Table 1).
Uncertainty about mitigation costs and benefits (social cost of carbon) is met by 
setting quantity targets for emission reductions, while complementing them with 
minimum and maximum prices. At the EU level, the targets are determined by the 
EU’s commitments, as enshrined in the Paris Agreement and the aim of the global 
community to avoid ‘dangerous’ climate change. Germany, then, has derived its 
pricing policies from the quota the EU has allocated to Germany.
Distributional concerns have been mostly dealt with at the national level. Ger-
man policy-makers decided against the much-discussed tax-and-dividend approach, 
instead opting for reducing regressive energy taxes and large green spending 
programs.
There are reasons to expect that the sectoral fragmentation at the EU level 
will be ameliorated by an incremental integration of the current non-ETS sec-
tors into the trading scheme. The German case is particularly interesting as the 
government has established a coordinating institution at the highest level of the 
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executive branch. A so-called “Climate Cabinet” was formed that convened all 
ministries with responsibilities for national climate policy. This facilitated coor-
dination of policies across sectoral boundaries. Internationally, a Coalition of 
Finance Ministers for Climate Action has emerged, which has committed itself to 
the so-called Helsinki Principles, one of which states that this group is to “work 
towards measures that result in effective carbon pricing”. This could also improve 
intra-governmental coordination, especially between the ministries of finance and 
of the environment.
The problem of the unstable tax base has, thus far, been addressed by earmarking 
the revenues for specific projects or temporary expenses, special-purpose funds or 
simple lump-sum transfers to citizens. Examples include the national Swiss carbon 
price, California’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund, Chile’s Economic and Social 
Stabilization Fund and the revenue volatility management that France has imple-
mented to deal with EU ETS auction revenues (World Bank 2019).
The lack of trust in government, in general, and in carbon pricing, in particu-
lar, remains an enormous challenge for economists, other experts, and the interac-
tion between the latter and policy-makers. Here, substantial efforts are needed to 
start a joint learning process among scientists, policy-makers and citizens about dif-
ferent perceptions of fairness, trade-offs and functioning of specific policy meas-
ures (Kowarsch et al. 2016). Deliberative learning processes could help to improve 
the outcome of government processes and increase trust in government decisions. 
Empirically, there is a significant positive correlation between trust in governments 
and the quality of institutions, on the one hand, and carbon price levels, on the other 
(Klenert et al. 2018; Levi et al. 2020).
On the problem of repugnant markets, recent research on financial incentives 
and moral behavior suggests that direct pricing through taxes is better at tapping 
into moral behavior and intrinsic motives to reduce emissions than indirect pric-
ing through emissions trading. In a recent experiment, Ockenfels et al. (2020) have 
shown that there is a fundamental difference between direct pricing and indirect 
pricing through emissions trading. While direct pricing increases voluntary abate-
ment, indirect pricing reduces the latter. Market participants understand that volun-
tary abatement in indirect pricing schemes lowers the market price and therefore 
the incentive to abate. The experiment, thus, shows that a stable price incentivizes 
voluntary abatement.
While these considerations suggest that carbon taxes are better able to mobilize 
intrinsic moral behavior than emissions trading, labeling a Pigouvian price as ‘tax’ 
reduces public support significantly (Kallbekken et al. 2011). This phenomenon has 
been coined tax aversion (McCaffery and Baron 2003): Just by calling a specific 
instrument a tax, people tend to have negative association compared to other labe-
ling. Labeling Pigouvian taxes as ‘fees’ or ‘charges’ has therefore been suggested to 
increase support (Baranzini and Carattini 2017).
Because of the European Commission’s power to use financial sanctions, the EU 
climate policy constitutes a strong commitment device for national climate policies. 
Nevertheless, credibility of financial sanctions might be weakened if national gov-
ernments expect also many other governments to not comply with a specific direc-
tive. Because of consensus principles in many areas, the EU climate policy exhibits 
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large inertia, impeding a flexible adjustment of climate policy to new information of 
technology costs, climate damages or climate policies in other countries.
4  Remaining research gaps and research agenda
While some progress on carbon pricing has been made, there remain some funda-
mental challenges and significant gaps in our understanding of the theoretical under-
pinnings of Pigouvian pricing. Here, we will discuss the three areas that are most 
pertinent to public policy and, as such, merit closer attention: Macroeconomic sta-
bility and implications of the Covid-19 pandemic; commitment and credibility of 
climate policy; carbon pricing revenues and distribution.
4.1  Macroeconomic stability and implications of the Covid‑19 pandemic
The economic downturn caused by measures to contain the Covid-19 pandemic has 
demonstrated the momentous nature of global economic shocks. GHG emissions 
have fallen significantly. Unfortunately, this temporary, lockdown-induced decline 
only took us to the level of emissions produced in 2006 (Le Quéré et al. 2020)—and 
emissions have, historically, quickly started rising after crises (Peters et al. 2012). 
More importantly, the shock of the pandemic highlights the vulnerability of finan-
cial markets to tail events (Schnabel 2020).
While carbon pricing dominates the debate about climate policy instruments, 
finance experts increasingly argue for systematically assessing other options to 
enhance mitigation efforts and to incorporate risks of climate impacts as well as mit-
igation policies into broader macroeconomic policies (Campiglio 2016; IMF 2019b; 
Schnabel 2020). In this respect, there are three different types of macroeconomic 
policies: Fiscal policy, financial policy and monetary policy. Optimal carbon pric-
ing, a fiscal policy tool, is a necessary condition for the market failure caused by 
GHG emissions to be corrected. Additionally, governments might have to increase 
spending for the energy transition, e.g., related to public goods like infrastructure or 
innovation.
However, fiscal policy likely has to be complemented by financial and monetary 
policy tools in order to facilitate private finance flows directed at low carbon invest-
ments and to mitigate systemic risks associated with climate policy. These systemic 
risks arise due to tail events related to physical climate impacts, green technology 
breakthroughs or bursting fossil asset price bubbles (Bolton et  al. 2020). Finan-
cial policy can help redress the underpricing and the lack of transparency of cli-
mate risks. It can also address short-term biases, improve governance frameworks 
of financial institutions, support the development of green financial securities and 
promote climate finance.
Carbon pricing as well as climate impacts might have strong impacts on relative 
prices and, thus, inflation levels (Diluiso et al. 2020). Therefore, they strongly inter-
act with Central Banks’ mandate of price stability. Optimal financial portfolios are 
often determined by backward-looking assessments of returns. Climate change and 
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climate policy require forward-looking models and scenario approaches for man-
aging financial portfolios—by financial investors as well as central banks (Bolton 
et al. 2020). Moreover, green quantitative easing and collateral frameworks could be 
established and combined with appropriate credit allocation policies to avoid invest-
ments into fossil-based capital stocks (IMF 2019b). The ECB, for example, is taking 
first steps to improve disclosure requirements and to reduce informational inefficien-
cies, but may also consider excluding bonds that conflict with the decarbonization 
objectives of the EU—a step that will be discussed by the ECB Governing Council 
at the next monetary policy strategy review (Schnabel 2020). The literature offers 
little insights into frameworks for discussing the most effective policy mix of these 
tools. The coordination of instruments seems, however, very important, in particular 
owing to the unprecedented scale of climate change. Moreover, there is an important 
concern that central banks might overstep their mandate when engaging actively in 
climate policy, filling the fiscal and environmental policy gaps arising from insuf-
ficient government action (EPP Group in the European Parliament 2020). In par-
ticular, central banks might not be able to achieve multiple objectives when a clear 
mechanism to evaluate trade-offs is missing and banks lack the requisite tools for 
effectively addressing each objective (Dikau and Volz 2020).
4.2  Commitment and credibility of climate policy
Improving commitment and credibility in climate policy and carbon pricing remains 
an important challenge. Under certain circumstances, it is preferable to delegate 
decisions and responsibilities to a technocratic body in order to remove decisions 
from direct political influence. Economic theory has provided some general insights, 
which can be applied to climate policy (Benassy-Quere et al. 2019). Based on these 
considerations, an independent European carbon bank might be a preferable option 
to strengthen commitment if the following conditions are fulfilled:
1. The emission reductions pathway or the carbon budget is well-defined by legiti-
mate democratic institutions. This implies that the ultimate goals of climate policy 
are determined by democratically elected governments.
2. The performance criteria for implementing policy instruments are well-under-
stood. The carbon bank administers the auctioning process of permits, implements 
a minimum price and manages the inclusion of all relevant sectors. Additionally, 
the carbon bank provides subsidies to negative emission technologies. It also has 
to approve and regulate new negative emission technologies according to politi-
cally determined criteria, monitor relevant secondary market failures that impede 
the effectiveness of carbon pricing and assess whether investments into fossil and 
carbon-free technologies are consistent with the overall long-term climate goal.
3. The carbon bank acts independently of any revenue objectives and is independ-
ent from lobbying by firms or national governments, as this increases the risk of 
time-inconsistent carbon pricing (Kalkuhl et al. 2020). The institutional design 
has to ensure this independence.
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4. The carbon bank does not consider distributional effects between member states 
or among the income distribution as part of their mandate to avoid following 
multiple objectives. National governments are responsible for addressing dis-
tributional effects within their jurisdictions via their national tax systems. Dis-
tributional impacts across countries, in particular concerning the revenues from 
carbon prices (e.g., due to adjusting the cap or the minimum price), should be 
governed by pre-defined effort sharing principles, which member states agreed 
upon. The intergenerational distribution is determined by an efficient dynamic use 
of the carbon budget and the net negative emission technologies. Both have to be 
adjusted when new scientific information about climate impacts and mitigation 
costs become available. Ideally, the adjustment is based on pre-defined rules.
5. A minimum price within the EU emissions trading scheme might allow consid-
ering idiosyncratic preferences of the EU member states on climate mitigation. 
Complementary policies of EU member states are less distortionary compared 
to a trading scheme without minimum prices.
It is debatable whether an institution, like an independent carbon bank, can be 
designed according to the above principles, thereby reducing the vulnerability to 
time inconsistency. Two fundamental research questions have to be answered: First, 
what is the optimal degree of ‘delegation’ with regard to the unavoidable trade-off 
between investment security and democratic principles to adjust policies? Second, 
what are optimal rules for setting carbon prices or price collars? In particular, the 
optimal rules must determine how marginal costs and benefits are measured—and 
how domestic carbon prices are strategically linked to carbon prices in other coun-
tries to enhance international coordination.
4.3  Carbon pricing revenues and distribution
Finally, more attention should be paid to the question of integrating carbon pricing 
within the broader fiscal systems of (national) governments. In particular, there is a 
need for more research on questions of horizontal equity of carbon pricing, the vola-
tility of carbon pricing revenues and intertemporal allocation of revenues and debts 
associated with Pigouvian policies.
There is already some research on the public economics of climate change that 
examines the fiscal properties of carbon pricing (de Mooij et  al. 2012; Edenhofer 
et  al. 2017; Jones et  al. 2013; Siegmeier et  al. 2018). Pigouvian taxation has also 
been studied in optimal taxation frameworks (for an excellent overview, see Arons-
son and Sjögren 2018), where most attention has been given to the double dividend 
hypothesis (Goulder et al. 2016) and distributional effects with respect to different 
incomes (e.g., Jacobs and van der Ploeg 2019).
However, most models used to study the role of carbon pricing for the optimal 
tax portfolio are limited to income distributions along the vertical dimension, that is, 
between different income groups. Little is known about horizontal equity between 
heterogeneous households of the same income decile (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976; 
Fischer and Pizer 2019), even though empirical studies have demonstrated that 
1115
1 3
Pigou in the 21st Century: a tribute on the occasion of the 100th…
distributional impacts of climate policy within income groups show the largest vari-
ation (Cronin et al. 2018; Pizer and Sexton 2019; Poterba 1991; Rausch et al. 2011).
Moreover, a finance ministry seeking to integrate carbon pricing within the gen-
eral system of public finance will very likely have to deal with the problem of man-
aging an uncertain and potentially volatile revenue stream. This is due to (a) the 
unknown impact of carbon pricing on the economy (e.g., the speed of its decarboni-
zation) and (b) the imperfect political process of implementing carbon pricing (e.g., 
how quickly effective price levels and full sectoral coverage can be reached). Man-
aging such uncertainties sustainably remains an open research question.
Finally, to reach ambitious mitigation targets, mitigation scenarios show the 
importance of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies (Strefler et  al. 2018). 
In contrast to the harmful over-production of GHG emissions by private agents, 
such CDR technologies are subject to a harmful under-provision by private mar-
kets. Hence, theory tells us that Pigouvian subsidies are required. This raises several 
questions about optimal fiscal policy. For example, it is unclear how to generate the 
necessary public funds to finance such subsidies. It is also unclear how to achieve 
optimal intertemporal smoothing of the streams of public income and public debt 
associated with Pigouvian policies.
5  Conclusions
The challenges of Pigouvian taxation should not be dismissed too easily. There are, 
indeed, thorny problems—both of a political and theoretical nature—that cast doubt 
on the political feasibility of Pigouvian taxation: uncertainties about marginal social 
benefits; moral objections to putting a price tag on environmental goods and ser-
vices; coordination and responsibility problems within governments; a lack of abil-
ity to commit to Pigouvian pricing principles; a lack of trust in effectiveness and 
fairness of a Pigouvian tax, even when supplemented with sophisticated compensa-
tion schemes; the diminishing tax base demanding frequent adjustments in the gov-
ernment budget; and lastly, international cooperation on climate policy that has been 
notoriously hard to achieve.
But an excessive focus on the challenges of Pigouvian taxation unjustly disre-
gards the growing political successes of carbon pricing. Today, 100 years after the 
publication of Pigou’s magnum opus, we see remarkable success stories, even under 
second-best conditions. There is a Pigouvian moment within the EU, as evidenced 
by its ambitious climate targets. The momentum is, however, still fragile and needs 
to be solidified as part of the next reform steps.
The fragility of Pigou’s success becomes apparent when considering recent 
criticisms of carbon pricing. The latter charge Pigouvian taxation with either being 
‘politically infeasible’ (Bell 2018; Cullenward and Victor 2020; Heal 2020) or, at 
best, achieving marginal improvements, while failing to implement an all-encom-
passing transformation of our societies to carbon neutrality (Rosenbloom et  al. 
2020). Nevertheless, such critiques often remain silent when it comes to the eco-
nomic costs and distributional effects of alternative paradigms. Given that there is no 
clear consensus on the more general drivers of ‘political feasibility’, it also remains 
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unclear how to evaluate the political feasibility of alternative paradigms rigorously. 
As the reflections on the double dividend and the distributional effects have shown, 
it is useful to broaden prevailing economic models by endogenizing aspects that had 
been considered an exogenous constraint. This approach of considering multiple dis-
tortions actually corresponds to the Pigouvian principle of determining the level of 
tax that maximizes welfare.
A key political and institutional challenge consists in enhancing state capacity to 
assess and monitor market failures and externalities in a rigorous and comprehensive 
way. Governments devote much effort to collecting data on economic indicators, like 
GDP, employment, inflation, prices and expenditures. Yet, governments often lack 
a basic understanding of the size of market failures and externalities that deprive 
their citizens of their economic potential. An institution, tasked with rigorously and 
regularly assessing externalities, is a pre-condition for increasing the political feasi-
bility of Pigouvian pricing. This is also important with respect to identifying related 
market failures that dilute the power of Pigouvian pricing (e.g., principal-agent or 
information problems in the building sector) as well as responding swiftly to new 
externalities that might be triggered by addressing other externalities (e.g., biodiver-
sity losses due to increased biomass use under high carbon prices).
We conclude our tribute to Arthur Cecil Pigou with an invitation to follow his 
lead by tying rigorous economic theory to the pressing issues of our time and by 
making it relevant to actual modern societies. Economists can help significantly to 
enhance the implementation of the Pigouvian legacy by addressing research gaps 
related to the macroeconomic dimensions of Pigouvian taxation, by finding ways 
of enhancing commitment as well as setting up compensation schemes that are 
consistent with various normative principles. And they should rigorously compare 
Pigouvian approaches with alternative paradigms that seem to be politically less 
demanding. The latter is indispensable to enable a deliberative public discourse on 
efficient and fair environmental policy—and to increase trust in economists, experts 
and advisors. These steps are vital if we are to follow Pigou’s example as a public 
intellectual, attuned to the subtleties of the academic literature, cognizant of politi-
cal realities and passionate about helping our societies deal with economic, environ-
mental and broader societal problems.
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